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QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL        <-----------Line #1 goes here ***********
1 CAMINO DEL CANYON
SANTA CLAUSITA CA 91111








IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  Line #8
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLAUSITA



STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
      Plaintiff in error
                   
               v.


QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL,
      Defendant in error
	Case No.  XXXXXX
NOTICE OF SWORN MOTION TO DISMISS and SWORN MOTION TO DISMISS FOR WANT OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SWORN MOTION TO DISMISS
Hearing Date:
Time:
Location:         Santa Clausita Civic Center - - Courtroom N
Calendar:         Traffic
Judge:
Filing Date:
QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL, proceeding in propria persona, hereinafter the ACCUSED, will appear specially at the above-styled court for a hearing on the herein motion at a time and in a room to be set by the judge at which time the ACCUSED will motion the above-styled court to dismiss said instant case.
In support of this motion, the ACCUSED has filed with the clerk of the above-styled court her MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES which shall be considered as incorporated into this action as fully as though physically written on the pages of this motion.

I, QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL, state:
1.  It is an undisputed fact that the proceedings in this action are not being styled nor conducted as a criminal action. (See Penal Code part 2.)
2.  It is an undisputed fact that the proceedings in this action are not being styled nor conducted as a civil action. (See Code of Civil Procedure part 2.)
3.  It is an undisputed fact that the proceedings in this action are not being styled nor conducted as an administrative adjudicatory action. (See Gov. Code title 2, division 3, part 1, chapters 4.5 and 5 .)
4.   It is an undisputed fact that the municipal court was created by the California Legislature. (See Cal. Const., art. 6, §  5 subd.(c).)
5.   It is an undisputed fact that the above-styled court is a legislative court of quasi-judicial power.
6.   It is an undisputed fact that the ACCUSED is one of the holders of the inherent political power and is entitled to all the unalienable rights of such persons pursuant to the common law of immemorial antiquity and those rights are protected by the California Constitution and the federal Constitution. (See Cal. Constitution Arts. 1 and 2 and the first ten articles in amendment, by and through the 14th amendment of the federal Constitution.)
7.   It is an undisputed fact that the rights of the ACCUSED can not be derogated or abrogated by lawmaking or rulemaking. (See Miranda v.Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.)
8.   It is an undisputed fact that the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is charged with enforcing the Motor Vehicle Act. (See Veh. Code §  1650 and its legislative history.)
9.   It is an undisputed fact that the judge and the prosecutor in this action sit in ministerial capacity in the enforcement of administrative laws for and on behalf of the Director of the DMV. (See ACCUSED’S attached memorandum and Vehicle Code §  8.)
10.  It is an undisputed fact that the judge in this action is conducting a delegated administrative adjudicatory proceeding. (See Gov. Code §  11500 subd. (a).)
11.  It is an undisputed fact that the complaint in this action is an accusation pursuant to Government Code section 11503. (See ACCUSED’S attached memorandum.)
12.   It is an undisputed fact that the accusation in this action cites only statutes and does not cite any implementing rules pursuant to Government Code section 11503. (See the Uniform Traffic Citation numbered ___________________________.)
13.   It is an undisputed fact that a legislative power court's jurisdiction must appear on the face of the proceedings and can not be assumed as in a court of general jurisdiction. (See Petersen v. Civil Service Board (1924) 67 CA 70, 78.)
14.   It is an undisputed fact that the above-styled court is without subject-matter jurisdiction in that the face of the proceedings does not evidence any allegation that the ACCUSED has violated any implementing rules as defined at Government Code section 11342 subdivision (g) having been duly certified, filed and published in  accordance with Government Code §  11344, subdivision (d). (See case file.)
15.  It is an undisputed fact that the hearing officer in the above-styled action has a ministerial duty to inform the ACCUSED of the nature of both the statutes AND rules that the ACCUSED is alleged to have violated. (See Gov. Code § 11503.)
16.   It is an undisputed fact that the hearing officer in the above-styled action has failed to perform its ministerial duty to inform the ACCUSED of the nature of both the statutes and rules that the ACCUSED is accused of violating.
17.   It is an undisputed fact that the hearing officer in this action is proceeding beyond its ministerial limitations with willful intent to irreparably harm, damage, and injure the ACCUSED.
18.   It is an undisputed fact that public officers are not cloaked with immunity in the performance of their ministerial duties when they fail to perform their ministerial duties in accordance with the controlling statutory scheme. (See Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District (1961) 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94.)
19.   It is an undisputed fact that state actors are liable in their private capacity when they damage a person under color of law, using color of process, using color of office. (See US Title 42, § 1983.) 
20.  It is an undisputed fact that the above-styled court has no discretion to prosecute the ACCUSED in this action.
21.  It is an undisputed fact that the above-styled court has a ministerial duty to dismiss the cause of action.
22.  It is an undisputed fact that the above-styled court is committing damaging acts of trespass against the ACCUSED under color of law, using color of process, under color of office.
Wherefore the foregoing factual matters (averments 1 through 22) must be deemed and admitted as true unless specifically denied by the prosecution by verified statements--notwithstanding that in no case can a citizen's rights be abrogated by legislation or
rulemaking--and therefore, upon the face of the record, the ACCUSED requests the trial court dismiss the cause for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I, QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL, am the defendant in this action.  I have read the above motion and know its contents.  The facts alleged in the motion are true of my own knowledge.  I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that the foregoing is true and correct.  
DATED:____________ 19______  at Santa Clausita, California;

                

         __________________________

         QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL













QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL    <----------Line #1 goes here*******
1 CAMINO DEL CAN
Santa Clausita CA 91111







    IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Line #8
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLAUSITA



STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
      Plaintiff in error
                   
               v.


QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL,
      Defendant in error
	Case No.  XXXXXX
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SWORN MOTION TO DISMISS
Hearing Date:
Time:
Location:         SANTA CLAUSITA Civic Center - - Courtroom:
Calendar:         Traffic
Judge:
Filing Date:
I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant in this action, herinafter the ACCUSED, has been charged with violating various petty infractions found within the California Vehicle Code.  The ACCUSED, via this memorandum, will attempt to prove to the court that the statutes violated are private administrative laws, that the accusations are null and void, that administrative laws have no force and effect of law without the secondary legislation duly promulgated by the administering agency, that the municipal court is without subject-matter jurisdiction because of the lack of that secondary legislation, and that the municipal court is not the proper disciplinary hearing forum for violators of administrative laws.                                                 
II.  ARGUMENT
(A)  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON LAWMAKING  
Our Founding Fathers created a form of government that is unique in the world in that the People rather than the state are held to be the sovereign.   All of our state and federal solemn chartering instruments of Constitution express this fact at the Declaration of Rights Section of those Constitutions.   Our People's Declaration of Rights is found within our solemn instrument at Article II, Section I, wherein it is stated that all political power is inherent in the People and that government is instituted for the People’s protection, security, and benefit.   This section holds Primacy of Position over the Declaration of Powers section.   This section means that the People are the source of all political power and that the political powers of the state are derived only from the People and no other source but the People.   Since all political power is derived only from the People the state may not exercise any political power not derived from the People.   The People make a gift of their inherent political power to the state via the Declaration of Powers section of our Constitution.   That gift of political power is held in trust by the state and exercised via our 3 branch system of government as expressed in that solemn chartering instrument.   This scheme is called the Separation of Powers Doctrine.   The executive branch enforces the laws, the judicial branch interprets the laws, and the legislative branch creates the laws.   The People elect legislators to serve in an office of trust to create laws for the People.   The Bills which are passed by the Legislature must meet very strict constitutional tests before they are enacted into each year's statutes from which the codes are constructed.  The strictest test which each bill must meet is whether the police power to enforce a proposed law can be derived from the People's inherent political power.  A bill which does not pass this strict test can not be enacted into Public Law.  The act of creating a law by passing a bill from which the police power to enforce the law is not derived from the People's inherent political power would be an usurpation of political power and an act of treason to the People.  Treason leads to tyranny, and tyranny leads to revolution.  Our Founding Fathers had experienced this cycle of destruction and they wisely gave us our 3 branch form of republican government.   
(B)  PRIVATE STATUTES NOT BOUND BY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS  
 Our modern-day legislature passes bills into law every day that do not meet the terms of this strict constitutional test.   These laws, however, will always be found to be placed within chapters of the Codes which have been entrusted to the heads of administrative agencies for "administration and enforcement".   These administrative agencies are known as the "fourth branch of government".   The legislature creates these agencies for the express purpose of administering and enforcing a very finite body of law which the legislature has created.   These laws are called "administrative laws".  These administrative laws are enacted pursuant to the Social Contract Doctrine.  The laws of our state are classified by Code of Civil Procedure section 1898 as being either private statutes or public statutes.   Private statutes are not bound by constitutional limitations on lawmaking.   For example, at Education Code section 51530 we find a law that proscribes the teaching or advocacy of the political doctrine of Communism by teachers in our public schools.   This law was enacted in 1951 during the zenith of McCarthyism.   This law is prima facie unconstitutional.   At Education Code section 33308, (as based on School Code section 2.1334 at page 96 as found bound into the 1929 Statutes and Amendments to the California Codes) we find that this law is to be administered and enforced by the executive head of the Department of Education.   This McCarthyite law is a private statute.   All administrative laws are private statutes which concern only certain designated individuals and affect only their private rights.   The designated individuals being the executive head of the responsible agency and the persons or classes of persons named in the implementing rules for each and every private administrative statute.   The Cyclopedic Law Dictionary defines private rights as being a subset of the civil rights which are divided into being either absolute or relative.   The relative rights are public or private.   The public rights are those which subsist between the people and the government.   Although the executive head of an administrative agency is touched with the sovereignty and is therefore a "public officer", an agency and the executive head of an agency can not be deemed to be the government but merely an arm of the government.   The private rights are the reciprocal rights of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant, and thusly it follows, "licenser and licensee", and "regulator and regulatee".   Evidence of administrative law must be maintained in the legislative record so as to shield actions undertaken pursuant to administrative laws from collateral attack upon constitutional grounds.   Evidence of administrative law within the state of California is almost always found within the Statutes as amended.   When not found within the Statutes as amended it is to be found within the Legislative Counsel's Summary Digest of Enacted Statutes and Amendments to the Codes.   The Digest is the proper resource to determine Legislative intent, Shelton v.  City of Westminster (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 610, 614.   For example, it is only within the Summary Digest do we find that the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) is to be administered and enforced by the Department of Pharmacy and the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, (see the Legislative Counsel's Digest of Assembly Bill 192, chapter 1407, at page 211 of the 1972 Summary Digest, as bound into volume 2 of the 1972 Statutes).   No mention of these powers and duties is made within the UCSA itself.   The aforesaid example sheds light on how pervasive administrative law is within our jurisprudence scheme.   Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act is the very foundation of the business of modern American government.  The euphemism for the APA , the literal string "section 11340", is found within the text of the entirety of the California Codes approximately 463 times, (submit query at www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html ).
(C) MUNICIPAL COURT IS NOT THE PROPER FORUM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE    ADJUDICATION  
Let us compare and contrast the statutory powers, duties, adjudicatory proceedings, and enabling legislation of the Dept.  of Motor Vehicles (DMV) with those of the Bureau of Home Furnishings and Thermal Insulation (BHFTI).   The DMV is a component Department of the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency (BTHA).   The BHFTI is a component department of the State and Consumer Services Agency (SCSA).   The SCSA and the BTHA are both legislative creature executive branch administrative agencies as defined at Government Code section 12800.   The heads of all these agencies are appointed by the Governor.   The director of the DMV has been charged with adopting rules for and enforcing the Motor Vehicle Act by Vehicle Code section 1650 as based on Statutes 1941, chapter 1238, section 1, page 3100 as later amended and repealed and re-enacted without substantial change.   Although the Statutes Extra Session 1947, chapter 16, section 3, page 3816 amendment amended the phrase “relating to the agency”, it is apparent from the Legislative Counsel’s Summary Digest of 1947 Senate Bill 3 at page 9 that the powers and duties of the Director of the DMV have not been altered by the 1947 amendment.   The chief of the BHFTI has been charged with adopting rules for and enforcing the Home Furnishings Act (see Bus.  & Prof.  Code, § 19031).   Thus we find that the only difference between the DMV and the BHFTI is found within the subject-matter of the laws enforced by the two agencies.   It would therefore follow that the administrative adjudicatory proceedings of the two agencies should be identical.   At Business & Professions Code section 19209 we find that indeed a Home Furnishing Act violator is entitled as of right to a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Adjudication chapter of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).   Why is the ACCUSED's instant case being heard in a municipal court when by the terms of  Government Code section 11501 subdivision (b) 41 , she is entitled to a formal administrative hearing?  ACCUSED does not know the answer but ACCUSED does know that a procedural due process of law violation is being committed by the agencies as a very extensive body of administrative case-law holds that administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort to the courts.  This jurisdictional prerequisite is clearly laid out in Mcleod v.  Los Angeles (1967) 256 C.A.2d 693, 696.
(D)  ADMINISTRATIVE ACCUSATIONS ARE NULL AND VOID WITHOUT CONCURRENTLY CITING BOTH STATUTES AND RULES  
If an agency delegates its powers and duties to a public officer, the officer's ministerial actions remain the acts of the agency, the court has ruled in Cal.  School Employee’s Assn.  v.  Personnel Comm.  of P.V.U.S.D.  (1970) Sup., 89 Cal.Rptr.  620, 623.   It therefore follows that the complaint in the instant case remains an administrative accusation.  Regardless of whether the agency itself conducts an adjudicatory proceeding or the agency delegates its adjudicatory proceedings pursuant to Government Code section 11500(a), (see also California Law Revision Commission comments to Gov.  Code section 11405.40, Deering's Ann.  Gov.  Code (1998 ed.) p.  124), the jurisdictional prerequisites of Government Code section 11503 still remain in force.   ACCUSED's instant case involves  hearings to determine whether her license to locomote upon the public highways should be conditioned by the hearing officer.   Government Code section 11503 mandates the concurrent citing of statutes and rules to perfect an accusation.   A Court hearing disciplinary actions based upon administrative accusations which do not cite both the statutes and rules violated  is without subject-matter jurisdiction, as ruled in Wheeler v.  St.  Bd.  of Forestry (1982) 144 Cal.App.3d 522, 526.   The municipal court was created by the legislature (See Cal.  Constitution, Art.  6, § 5(c).).   It is well established that the legislature cannot grant judicial power.   The court has ruled in Petersen v.  Civil Service Board (1924) 67 CA 70, 78, that the jurisdiction of a legislative creature tribunal must appear on the face of the proceedings and cannot be assumed as in a court of general jurisdiction.   Petitioner is most perplexed to find that this fundamental due process of law related jurisdictional prerequisite is not mentioned within the entirety of the text of the Administrative Hearing Practice manual published by the Continuing Education of the Bar.
     (E) INFORMAL ADJUDICATION BOUND BY JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES
Although an agency as defined at Government Code section 11405.30, acting through a ministerial officer, is not required to conduct an adjudicative proceeding in order to formulate a decision to initiate a court prosecution (see Cal. L. Revision Comm'n com. to Gov. Code § 11415.50, Deering's Ann. Gov. Code (1998 ed.) p.  137), once the agency decides to initiate a prosecution and the agency head as defined at Government Code section 11405.40 delegates its adjudicatory power to hear and decide to a municipal court which then conducts an informal hearing as defined at Government Code sections 11445.10-11445.60, the jurisdictional prerequisites of Government Code section 11503 remain in force as the prerequisites have not been specifically exempted by any provision of Government Code title 2, division 3, part 1, chapter 4.5, article 10 (see Gov.  Code § 11445.40(a)).
(F)  ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS MUST BE INTERPRETED BY THE AGENCY TO HAVE THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF LAW  
It is a fundament of administrative law that for a person to come within the administrative jurisdiction of an administrative law there must be a licensure or contractual nexus connecting the person to the activity which the administrative agency purports to regulate.  The licensure or contractual nexus connecting a person to the jurisdiction of an administrative agency scheme is created when an implementing rule is adopted and duly promulgated by the administering agency to make specific the legislative intent of the statute's creator.   No provision of statute found within any of the various California administrative regulatory schemes can have the force and effect of law when there is no implementing rule as defined by Government Code section 11342 subdivision (g) having been duly certified, filed and published in accordance with Government Code section 11344, subdivision (d).   And those implementing rules, to give the force and effect of law to those implemented statutes, must make specific the legislative intent by specifying the named class of persons who are subject to those statutes before any court, of any political power, may have subject-matter jurisdiction over a person charged with violating an administrative law.   It is instructive to note how California Courts have decided on what constitutes a rule under the APA.   In Cal.  St.  Emp.  Assn v.  State of Cal.  (1990) 271 Cal.Rptr.  734, 737, the court ruled that an action of an agency qualifies as a rule based upon its effect upon a “class of persons” within the general public. The California Law Revision Commission has defined a regulation as being an agency action of general application, applicable to all members of a described class, (see Cal. L. Revision Comm'n com. to Gov. Code § 11405.50, Deering's Ann. Gov. Code (1998 ed.) p. 125).  The highest court in the land has ruled that an administrative law is without the force and effect of law if the responsible agency has not duly promulgated its interpreting rules, Fed.  Trade Comm'n v.  Ruberoid Co.  (1952) 343 U.S.  470, 487 and United States v.  Mersky  (1960) 361 U.S.  431, 438.
(G)  COURTS  ARE BOUND BY AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS  
In the court’s ruling in Johnston v.  Dept.  of Personnel Admin.  (1987) 236 Cal.Rptr.  853, 857, the Court has decided that a statute can only be interpreted and made specific by the administering agency when the agency duly promulgates its rules in accordance with the APA.  Even if the judge in the instant case were vested with judicial power said judge would have no discretion to interpret a statute for the agency, the court has ruled in Mission Pak v.  St.  Bd.  of Equalization (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 120, 124..
                                                 III.   CONCLUSION  
ACCUSED has referenced the Table of Statutes to Regulations found within the Master Index Volume of the California Code of Regulations which is published in accordance with Government Code section 11344 subdivision (d) and has found no rules specifying that the ACCUSED is subject to the strictly administrative jurisdiction of the Vehicle Code statutes she is charged with violating.  ACCUSED can only conclude that the DMV has adopted unpromulgated rules which specify that the ACCUSED’s class of persons is subject to the strictly administrative jurisdictions of the private statutes she is charged with violating.  ACCUSED finds that the accusations are defective.   ACCUSED finds that in the instant case she has been charged with violating various private administrative laws that are inchoate and not made specific by duly promulgated rules specifying that ACCUSED's named class of persons is subject to those various private administrative laws, notwithstanding that if a rule or regulation were available to be cited it is most improbable that such a rule might specifically name a class of persons upon which the statutes could be enforced in the second instance for want of constitutional delegation by the holders of the inherent political power to regulate the subject-matter by grant of delegated authority to the state legislature in the first instance.     ACCUSED finds that these laws are null and void ab initio.   ACCUSED finds that the instant case is being heard in an improper forum.   ACCUSED finds that the municipal court is without subject-matter jurisdiction over the above-styled cause and prays for just and swift remedy.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that the foregoing is true and correct.   
DATED:____________ 19______  at San Francisco, California;

                
                                                                                                                     

___________________________
QUENTIN QUASICRIMINAL